Analyzing ransomware negotiations with CONTI: An in-depth analysis

DFIR Research Group (https://difr.unipi.gr/)

Team Cymru (https://team-cymru.com/)

CONTI is a ransomware group that uses a double extortion attack to force its victims into paying. The group has more than $14m confirmed payments in bitcoin and has several high-profile victims in its portfolio. The latter is verified by the publication of the exfiltrated data of the victims who do not pay the requested ransom. Given the modus operandi of the group, we managed to intercept many of their negotiations, which provided us with intelligence into how they operate. The studied interactions correspond to more than a third of their earnings and are therefore quite indicative of how they work as a group.

Index terms— Ransomware, CONTI, cybercrime, blockchain forensics

Introduction

CONTI is a ransomware that uses the double extortion model to force their victims pay the ransom. In essence, the attackers will not only lock up a victim's files by encrypting them and demand ransom for their decryption, but they will also steal files and threaten to publish them on a website or otherwise leak them if their initial ransom request is not met. This model is not novel, as it has been introduced by MAZE and then used in other ransomware campaigns such as REvil, Ragnar, and Egregor, to name a few.

The group is being operated in the Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) model. Therefore, there is a group of developers who have developed the ransomware and distribute it to some affiliates that they recruit. These affiliates will use it once they penetrate a host. Each party keeps a share of the paid ransom, which are paid in some cryptocurrency.
The confirmed earnings of the CONTI group, based on a specialised Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) source that tracks ransomware - ransomwhere\(^1\), are currently $14,740,000. These earnings position CONTI among the most highly paid ransomware and due to the high impact on USA-based organisations "caused" the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to issue a dedicated flash alert\(^2\) and more recently the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has also issued a dedicated alert\(^3\). In what follows, we provide an insight on the transactions of more than a third (34.96\%) of CONTI earnings. According to the dedicated CONTI news site, which is currently available through the "open" web\(^4\) and through TOR,\(^5\) there are more than 450 organisations that have been hacked, and some of their data are now publicly available.

The basic phases of the means of infiltration, which are utilized by CONTI, are illustrated in Figure 1.

---

\(^1\) [https://ransomwhe.re/](https://ransomwhe.re/)


\(^3\) [https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a)

\(^4\) [https://continews.click](https://continews.click)

\(^5\) [https://continewsnv5otx5kaojekrrkto2qbu3gtqef22mn7eaxw3y6ncz3ad.onion](https://continewsnv5otx5kaojekrrkto2qbu3gtqef22mn7eaxw3y6ncz3ad.onion)
In principle, infiltration starts with the attackers sending a phishing email to the potential victim. Once the victim opens the email and unbeknown to him/her runs the malicious dropper, the attackers get initial access to the victim’s network and can execute code. Having gained initial access, the attackers try to establish a better foothold and perform lateral movement to perform the aimed objectives, with the end goal being to hold the victim hostage and force the victim to pay a ransom (a) to regain access to his/her data, which at the final stage of the attack are encrypted by CONTI, (b) to prevent publication/selling of his/her data.

In this context, the attackers try to brute force credentials, perform an LSASS memory dump, or even exploit some existing vulnerabilities to elevate privileges. Once this is done, the attackers try to turn off infected/infiltrated systems’ antivirus solutions (AVs) as well as other existing security mechanisms. Subsequently, the attackers will scan the network for other servers/workstations to gain additional access.

Then, the infected/infiltrated host(s) is (are) attached to a Cobalt Strike C2 server controlled by the attackers. Afterwards, the attackers use RClone\(^6\) to upload the exfiltrated data to a cloud service (usually Mega\(^7\)).

Finally, the attackers launch the ransomware "encryptor" to lock the victim’s files. After the encryption, CONTI leaves a "README" file in each folder that it encrypts, which notifies the victim of the attack that his/her data have been encrypted and provides means to contact the CONTI team to pay the ransom and get the decryption software. In prior versions, the team used email addresses as means of communication. However, they developed a portal later, where users could contact CONTI using an ID that they were assigned. In these cases, the template of the ransomware notice is in the form of Figure 2.

\(^6\) https://rclone.org/
\(^7\) https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-conti-ransomware-tlp-white.pdf
CONTI has been used in several attacks of high-profile organizations, has been deployed along with BazarLoader, and is considered a stakeholder of the ransomware cartel, as a member of the Wizard Spider threat group (ClearSky Cyber Security 2021; DiMaggio 2021).

Up to now, there are many detailed technical reports about several ransomware and how they operate. Among them, many of these reports deal with CONTI. Moreover, there are reports which showcase how CONTI works operates when infiltrating an organization.

More generally, there are studies about ransomware payments, economics (Laszka, Farhang, and Grossklags 2017; Hernandez-Castro, Cartwright, and Cartwright 2020) or

---

---BEGIN ID---
1234abcd1234ABCD1234abcd1234ABCD1234abcd1234ABCD
---END ID---

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first public report about the actual negotiation process used in a ransomware campaign and not just about a small fragment of the process, e.g. (ClearSky Cyber Security 2021). The basic reason is that up to now, this intelligence was internal. Besides the perpetrator, only the victim and the delegated victim's personnel would have access to this information, while there would not be any further communication of this exchange beyond perhaps the payment wallet address.

Therefore, operational information, statistics about the steps of the performed negotiations, possible ransom discounts, errors, or even other requests of both sides are not publicly documented nor discussed. Filling this gap, this report provides a good insight into the internal operations of such processes and can be considered rather representative based on the profiles of the compromised organisations. Several patterns emerge from both negotiating sides (victims and ransomware operators) in terms of followed processes, existing pitfalls, and provided services.

We argue that this report sheds light on a very shady topic which, despite all technical and legal measures to counter it, remains a very thorny issue for cybersecurity professionals and continues to grow as ransomware groups evolve their tactics.

Data collection methodology

To collect the samples for conducting our research, we used various open malware repositories and analysis services including, but not limited to Malware Bazaar, Triage, Hybrid Analysis, CAPE, JOE Sandbox, and VirusShare. Note that in all cases, we used publicly available samples.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that many web pages that discuss CONTI infections contain images that depict the ransomware notice without obfuscating the ID (see Figure 3).
The latter implies that the security consultants who shared these screenshots did not understand how they were publicly exposing their clients for the sake of publicity. The same applies to security consultants or internal IT/security teams, who uploaded the collected samples to malware analysis services, to have them analysed, without realising that in this way they put the targeted organisations at risk by revealing potentially targeted / maybe even internal not publicly available information\(^{11}\), as well as useful intelligence to any attackers, which might attempt a newer attack to the organisations, on how the latter handle malware-related incidents.

While there are several hundreds of CONTI samples online, the number of unique IDs is quite limited, which implies that during several campaigns, the spear-phishing emails may have contained different droppers; however, the encryptor (delivered in the final stage of the attack - the encryption phase -) that was used contained a specific ID per

victim at a time, which we later noticed that was reused. Notably, in many of the collected samples, one may notice that the ransomware notice asks the victim to contact the attacker by using ProtonMail, an email service provider which is well-known for the provided privacy and security features and provides also an "open" web\textsuperscript{12} and a TOR website URL.\textsuperscript{13, 14} This is especially relevant for the first versions of CONTI.

Table 1 illustrates some of these email addresses used by the earlier versions of CONTI. In many of the most recent collected samples, the ID is hardcoded within the binary and, in most cases, can be extracted by simply collecting the strings of the binary. The same applies to the used ProtonMail email addresses\textsuperscript{15}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:elsleepamlen1988@protonmail.com">elsleepamlen1988@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:southbvilolor1973@protonmail.com">southbvilolor1973@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:maxgary777@protonmail.com">maxgary777@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:ranosfinger@protonmail.com">ranosfinger@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:polzarutu1982@protonmail.com">polzarutu1982@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:flapalinta1950@protonmail.com">flapalinta1950@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:xersami@protonmail.com">xersami@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:heibeaufranin1971@protonmail.com">heibeaufranin1971@protonmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Some of the ProtonMail email addresses used by CONTI

In total, we extracted 115 unique IDs that we used to connect to the CONTI negotiation platform and extract the relevant negotiations in HTML format. From these IDs, 68 were

---

\textsuperscript{12} https://contirecovery.info

\textsuperscript{13} http://m232fdxbfmbrcbrijslaykxngft6nqfj6x4iedrgtab4qupzjlaid.onion

\textsuperscript{14} https://www.ccn-cert.cni.es/informes/informes-ccn-cert-publicos/5759-ccn-cert-id-02-21-conti-v3-ransomware-1/file.html

\textsuperscript{15} More ProtonMail email addresses used by Conti exist in various OSINT sources, ex. https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/17011-conti-ransomware
valid, and 47 contained negotiations or confirmed victims, i.e., the CONTI operators expected input from the victims.

Negotiations

The CONTI negotiations in general are relatively short, but they may last several weeks. The victims are communicating with the CONTI team through the provided CONTI Recovery Service links that are left in the ransomware notice and discuss the means of infiltration and encryption of their data. Please note that in the first versions of CONTI, the negotiations were initiated through email exchanges. Gradually, in the later versions, the CONTI team developed a specialised platform for the negotiations. The webpage was available on the "open" web with various TLDs (.top, .xyz, .best, etc.) and also through TOR. At the time of writing, it is available through web\textsuperscript{16} and through TOR\textsuperscript{17}.

The site’s design changes over time from the form of Figure 4 to the form of Figure 5.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Recovery Site of CONTI (contirecovery.best - contirecovery.info)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{16} https://contirecovery.ws
\textsuperscript{17} https://http://contirecj4hbzmyzuzyrzvrm2c65blmwhoj2cvf25zqj2dwrrqcq5oad.onion/
In principle, each victim is assigned with an ID that consists of 64 alphanumeric characters, and the victim must upload the README file to the web form as displayed in Figure 5.

In most cases, the CONTI team requires the representative of the victim to identify himself/herself as well as the victim organization. The latter implies that the people performing the negotiations are not always the same ones who penetrated the victim as the attacker should already know who the victim is.

Nevertheless, on several occasions, the chat is prepared, welcoming the victim organization with their title. If there is no interaction from the victims, the CONTI team
starts issuing threats, which initially concern the publication of the collected data on the CONTI News site, with additional threats to sell access to the data. See Figure 6.

![Figure 6](image1.png)

Figure 6 – CONTI Team Threatening to Sell the Victim’s Data

On several occasions, the CONTI team notifies the victims, which did not give in to their threats before the deadline provided by the CONTI team, that the publication of their data has started/finished and/or that a buyer for the data has been found. The chat activity is occasionally monitored by the operators, e.g., that a person logged in, see Figure 7.

![Figure 7](image2.png)

Figure 7 – Excerpt from the CONTI Negotiation Platform

The threats for publication/selling of the data, in the beginning, do not have a strict nor specific deadline. Depending on the interaction of the victim with the CONTI team (or lack of it), they evolve from generic to ‘soon’, ‘next week’, etc. Refer to Figure 7 for an example of a generic deadline.

When victims decide to negotiate the price, typically, they require a guarantee that their files will be recovered. Therefore, CONTI operators provide a ‘data pack’ as they call it,
which shows through the contained files the name of the victim and usually 30% of the
directory listing tree for the encrypted files. Moreover, they might ask the victim to
"provide two files for a test decryption", which they subsequently decrypt. The decrypted
files as well as the 'data pack' are provided to the victims through various usually
"obscure" file services. More precisely, for exchanging files with the victims, the CONTI
team uses the following services:

- https://qaz.im/
- https://transfer.sh/
- https://dropmefiles.com/
- https://www.sendspace.com/

The main reason for using these services is probably some of their features, e.g., the
services provide a deletion mechanism for the recipient of the uploaded files, they are
free, they do not require strong authentication.

The exchanged files are encrypted by using default mechanisms (e.g., the embedded
encryption mechanism of compression programs) and simple passwords (e.g., 123123) to
prevent compatibility issues for the recipients of the files.

After the introductions, the negotiation starts with an initial ransom price from the CONTI
team. Since all the negotiations did not lead to a deal, we report in Table 2 the initially
requested ransom and the agreed one that was paid for the payments that we could
verify through the bitcoin transactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initially requested ransom</th>
<th>Paid ransom</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>BTC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.05326047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>746,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>999,000</td>
<td>512,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.22997602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.00275566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.69536871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initially requested ransom</td>
<td>Paid ransom</td>
<td>Steps</td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.90692000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.87000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.42840261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.61000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.46426081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.46426081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.61000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3607000</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (average)</strong></td>
<td><strong>112.8912051</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Statistics from the confirmed payments of the collected negotiations.

Moreover, we report in sum the negotiation steps (how many different ransom amounts were asked by CONTI team and how many counteroffers the victims performed) as well as the ransom amounts in Bitcoin, which were paid to the corresponding wallets.

It should be highlighted that the attackers use the financial status and public reports of each separate victim to assess the requested ransom and stress this information through the discussions to press for increased prices. The latter is verified by the operational/training documents of the group, which were leaked in August by a "disgruntled employee", who "left" the group.

After the payment is made by the victims, CONTI operators provide the victim with a decryptor. A typical issue of the decryptor, which is reported by the victims, is that many files, subsequent to have been decrypted, keep the added ransomware extension (e.g., .LSNWX as in the intercepted chats and according to other sources¹⁸), which the victim has to manually remove, to access the decrypted files.

On some occasions, the victims requested feedback on how the attack was made. The response from the operators was rather generic as, e.g., the corresponding person was "inaccessible". The operators notified that an employee opened a malicious

link/attachment on an email that gave them access to the host to execute malicious code. From there, they only report the use of Mimikatz and other tools, as well as that they performed lateral movement to extract the domain/admin passwords. The latter is also aligned with the leaked operational/training documents of the group.

In some instances, the operators recommend their victims to use SentinelOne, Kaspersky, or Symantec security solutions, see Figure 8. Note again that the leaked operational/training documents of the group contained instructions on how to turn off Microsoft Defender and Sophos AV solutions. Apart from the decryptor, they often provide the log file of gshred, which they used to shred the files that they exfiltrated from their victim.

It should be noted that in one negotiation the team admitted having lost the files during exfiltration. Therefore, since the extortion for publishing the files could not work for them, they proposed a discount of 50% to the victim for the decryption tool, see Figure 9.
Examples have also been observed where the victims have successfully negotiated the payment of the ransom in smaller chunks, see Figure 10.

![Figure 10 - Request for payments in smaller chunks.](image)

We should also highlight that some negotiators seem to be aware that people may monitor these negotiations. Therefore, they may specifically request the deletion of these chats, see Figure 11.

![Figure 11 - Request for Chat Deletion](image)

Finally, of specific interest is the very well-known case of the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE)\(^9\). The initially requested price was $19,999,000. The HSE representative asked the team only for proof that they indeed had access to the data. After the proof was provided, it is probable that the public outcry forced the CONTI team to provide the

---

decryptor for free without any further discussion. Then, the HSE side proceeded with notifying the perpetrators of the legal actions that had been initiated against them.

Since there was no payment, CONTI team notified that they would try to sell the collected data. Notably, this negotiation was trolled by another person who accessed the relevant ID negotiation page.

Discussion

While it is rather common to share malware samples, it is rather odd to have such samples in the open. Clearly, the infected organizations or the tasked analysts opted to upload the samples as public samples without thinking of the consequences. In essence, without prior analysis, this is a rather lousy practice since, in targeted attacks, this may leak sensitive information.

Indeed, despite the fact this allows for snooping of the negotiations, it also impedes the process. As observed, third parties had intervened and 'trolled' the negotiations twice (not only in the HSE case) or made the perpetrators see that there is traffic and expect interactions from their victims when this was not the case. In an isolated case, the negotiations were continued in another platform since they were conducted with someone that according to the victim, should not have access to them. Even more, in several cases, the victims did not request proof of the decryption of their files or the shredding log, which shows a lack of capacity in handling such cases.

We should report that we have three cases where we do not have the full negotiations. Therefore, we do not know how they ended nor any bitcoin address to determine whether the victims paid the requested ransom. However, the victims are not listed in the exposure web page.

A very interesting finding has to do with the handling of the negotiations. As discussed, one would expect that each ID is targeted to a single organization, as this would be a result of a spear-phishing campaign. However, the latter is not actually the case as we
have noticed that the same IDs are used with new victims. Therefore, previous victims may look at the negotiations of new victims.

Moreover, we have observed that the negotiation chat is occasionally cleared. More precisely, not all chats are available continuously and not to their full extent. In fact, we have observed the removal of fragments of the discussion, with the most noticeable being the removal of bitcoin addresses. This implies that the operator of each negotiation has the option to clear part of the chat and that different operators could be assigned per ID. The reuse of IDs may imply the use of the same encryption key, so decryptors may work for other victims; however, with the ones at hand, this claim cannot be verified.

It should also be noted that the operators reuse a lot of wordings for, e.g., salutation, requesting interaction, ransom bidding. For instance, the exact same wording as in Figure 12 has been intercepted more than once. Indicatively, we point out that the exact same text with Figure 8 is used in another chat with the sole change that instead of Kaspersky, it was referring to Symantec. The above implies that apart from the leaked training/operational manuals, there is another ‘playbook’ for the negotiations, which includes what should be said and how.

Figure 12 – Reused salutation by the CONTI team.
During the negotiations, the operators try to appear as professionals, to belong to a greater group as in a formal organization and to be friendly to the victim without initiating further discussions. In fact, the group has been reported to be recruiting people through advertisements. The negotiation depending on the organization, may take several iterations and immediate payments are favored and discounted. The negotiators of the CONTI group, appearing as professionals, sometimes mention their victims as customers/clients and not as victims.

Finally, after the recent leaks of chats on the media, CONTI has introduced a CAPTCHA mechanism in the negotiation site.

Conclusion

The authors of this work do not by any means promote the payment of ransom. On the contrary, we illustrate how this trend has evolved into a multi-million industry worldwide and made organizations suffer. We illustrate in this research that several practices, such as sharing malware samples without proper sanitization of the binary, may have a boomerang effect on the victim by further exposing him/her.

Indeed, one can understand how such negotiations could be derailed by third parties entering the negotiations. Moreover, even if the victim paid for the ransom, third parties had access to the sensitive data and that the exposure could be even more augmented. In a wilder scenario, another adversary could jump in the conversation and convince the victim of being the original adversary and luring him/her into paying the ransom in another wallet or double encrypting the victim’s files.

Given the public leaks and their size, an obvious question that should be investigated is whether the victim organizations have reported these attacks appropriately, as legal obligations of, e.g., GDPR, set specific deadlines for these actions. The question is even

more relevant for the cases of organizations that paid the ransom and whose data leakages cannot be verified through the public leaks. In fact, the legal implications are an aspect that the CONTI team is often trying to use to convince their victims in paying the ransom, see Figure 13.

![Figure 13 – Stressing of Legal Obligations by the CONTI Negotiator](image)

References


